The issue revolving before us is whether there are objects, and then also objects of the mind. I forget what you termed the first one.
My issue has directly to do with how you are able to know that there is an object only of the mind, and then an object that is not of the mind. What criterion do you hold up in front of us To confirm that whatever object you’re talking about is an object of the mind as opposed to an object somewhere else￼?￼ ￼
Suppose your example is a rock. We’re standing together and you hold up this rock in front of me. And you say here is an object that is not of the mind and you throw it in my face. And it hits my nose and “ouch￼”.
OK. Now I hold up the object in front of you called “abstraction”. ￼￼ how are you to know, what criteria are you using, to say that the object called abstraction is merely an object of the mind?
Is it because I can’t touch it with my fingers? Shirley when I stick my fingers into snow I am feeling an abstraction. In this case, coldness. ￼
I am asking what criterion to knowledge. What criteria that is happening in the knowing of these things, what logistical routes do you use to confirm to me that such and such is a object merely in my thinking of it, as opposed to an object somewhere else?
I submit that whatever criterion you show me or present to me, so much as I might know it, is at once both an Object of the mind and an object of something else. For how could I even have any sort of knowledge whatsoever about what abstraction is if the very term “abstraction” was not referencing some thing of the universe? Does abstraction exist outside of the universe? Again, how is my mind able to discern what “actually objectively exists” from what “merely exists in the mind”?
Describe for me the logistical route by which these two things diverge such that there are these two essential kinds of existence is, which I don’t even know how we would go on to talk about whether they exist or not as objects or not since we don’t even have a common understanding of what not to exist could possibly mean if I could not know it as existing as some thing that is nonexistent.
Now, see, I am not making an argument that I don’t believe that if I walk into the house without opening the door I’m gonna slam my face and do something hard and getting a bloody nose. I’m not making any sort of idealist argument or empiricist argument or anything like that. I am simply bringing into question how you know the difference between an object of the mind and an object that is not of the mind￼.