Reply: A question of significance

I suppose one of the questions that inevitably must arise due to my work is how do I allow a rock to be a rock, and a tree to be a tree? Rather than …

Reply: A question of significance


Rather than “allow”, for me, a tree is a thing and a rock is a thing. Here I mean only as physical things. The one category is undifferentiated and equal “thing“

I suppose my question Would be: what is the difference between calling this a “category” and in “object”? Now, I asked this question Less to get in an argument over all sorts of various definitions and then theory of language and all that kind of stuff. Rather, I’m moving to being responsible for what I am doing when I use language, say, but in this case I’m not specifically pointing out language, but I am using the category “philosophy” as a sort of encompassing category in which the topic of language occurs. so, like I said elsewhere, I talk about it in terms of being responsible for what I’m doing when I am doing philosophy. And so that is what I’m responsible to; I am being responsible to philosophy under which language occurs. Now, it sounds as if you are being responsible to language under which philosophy occurs. So here we have a rock and a tree. we have a situation where the manner that I am addressing things, the way that I am approaching the situation is that philosophy is the universe into which everything else occurs. Because of that approach, there’s really nothing anyone can really say to me to dislodge philosophy as the basic or foundational ontological foundation. And this is because any argument that would try to displace it would somehow be appealing to my sense of another common category, which we could assume would be like “human”. The only way we could possibly make any sort of argument about what is more foundational is to appeal to the other person sense of a greater category, this greater category that I’m calling, say, human. And yet, as soon as I’ve use the word category, automatically, it would seem, to your ears, say, I must be indicating the same thing that you understand by category in your “language universe”. And so you might ask me about what my definition of “category” is. And I would say back to you, like I have many times before, I don’t think it really matters what my definition of “category” is because ultimately we both know what that word means. So what I’m getting at, if you can see, is that you would try to reduce everything to some linguistic universe by appealing to my sense of some larger category that is just assumed. Whereas I may argue that no I am talking about the larger category of philosophy under which nothing else occurs. And I would be trying to appeal to your sense of allowing a rock to be a rock and allowing a tree to be a tree. It would seem to me that indeed I would “allow” a rock to be a rock and a tree a tree, but you would not have to allow for it because the universe of language, say, is assumed in the philosophical discussion. Whereas I’m saying that, as an analogy, you were talking about rocks, and I am talking about trees. Indeed I would put it that due to my phenomenological regularity of wanting to reduce all things to my sense of righteousness and correctness, I indeed put that on hold and “allow” your universe of language, say, to exist in itself. I indeed must allow it, intentionally, because intentionality thereby become something that I intentionally use, rather than just some given thing that is ubiquitous to all beings that have any validity, namely human beings.

I do not “see” things become “less” but that, firstly, I have projected upon them values which are not there. And secondly, no matter how much I have projected upon the objects values they are still essentially unchanged (without values) as physical things, only that psychologically they have values which are of my object of the mind. In this way, I deal with both my objects of the mind and reality without compromising either.Both have significance so long as I continue to perceive (or project values upon) them.This is perhaps my version of AND.

I kind of like this use of “and”. But it seems like a conditional and, as if indeed the rock is just some neutral thing that has no ability or any values and then I have Ability to have values that I put on the rock. I wonder if indeed the values that I think that I’m putting onto the neutral object called a rock, is indeed rather the rock instilling values in me, actually placing its objectivity upon my being as a human.? but also, I’ve asked you this question before, logistically, how am I able to discern what are “my values of the mind” and this neutral object in front of me? But that’s me speaking from the sense that philosophy is what encompasses all else. I am not as much making an argument that I am correct as much as I am just suggesting that if you’re looking through the lens of language then both of our discourse is can exist side-by-side, what a blogger recently mentioned could be dialogic instead of dialectical. Then perhaps your world of language in my world of philosophy can begin to see things that are in common with each other as well as we are differences can develop new interactions maybe. I don’t know really this is kind of all new to me. lol —

15 thoughts on “Reply: A question of significance

  1. Before we can move on with this, I need to point out that my philosophy is not only a philosophy of language, but must start with necessarily with ontology and epistemology. The root cause of the problem begins with the establishing what ontologically (not metaphysically) exists and how we have knowledge of that which exists and concepts of that which may or may not exist.


  2. Derrida he’s in both your lists!!

    I was just looking at lackoff on Wikipedia.

    The counseling theory which most appeals to me is, of course, the one that is founded in the latest philosophy. Which is narrative. Which draws a lot on Faucault.

    It is interesting, though, that since the 80s the trend for counseling theories it appears is really towards the cognitive. And it doesn’t really appear that there are really any theories for counseling that stem from philosophy proper. It seems like in the 80s we had some sort of split. Between kind of “New Age religious“, and “pure cognitive science“, And so counseling goes from one end of just pure cognitive processing and goals and how to achieve a persons goals, to the young inside and spiritually informed processes and techniques of encountering ones spirits, and all those kind of New Age kind of spiritually kind of stuff.

    Anyways, narrative therapy seems to also kind of go along with lack off and is metaphors. And one of my instructors is a death Counseling person and, aside from the all two typical Yungian approach to Depth psychology, what’s left over is kind of narrative, but one really steeped in mythological and metaphor.

    So from my brief Wikipedia look, it seems like lack off is saying that people live by certain archetypes that are found in the metaphors that they use.

    A depth approach to narrative is he there, on one hand, kind of a postmodern subject of power kind of look at developing people out of the problem story into a alternate story. But on the other hand of narrative, the depth approach cues into the way people are actually using language, the metaphor is they use, and begins to construct again and alternate story one that opposes the “problem story”

    Anyways. So if you like lack off you might want to read white and Epstein’s stuff on narrative therapy. It might interest you perhaps.

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  3. Lol. I guess it is the tourism guys. But the book White and Epston draw from is

    Bruner, Edward M. 1986b. “Ethnography as Narrative.” In The Anthropology of Experience, edited by Victor Turner and Edward M. Bruner, 139–55. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

    It’s kind of ironic. That you brought up the tourism thing. In my undergraduate anthropology remember one of the professors of the department that I was really interested in, the department “history of consciousness“— Which actually was very closely related to the anthropology department, at University of California Santa Cruz. I can’t remember the instructors name but I remember a class I took by him actually was about tourism. Lol. I totally forgot until just this minute when I looked under this Bruner again and that you’ve mentioned tourism. And then I looked through his bibliography and I started noticing the other titles. How funny!

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  4. Well, that Edward Bruener.

    In counseling there are all sorts of therapeutic approaches. Each approach defines for itself what problem is. And how to thus fix it. In a manner of speaking.

    I really like what is called “narrative therapy”. And I’m reading a book by the people that came up with this approach one of them is named Michael White and the other David Epston.

    So in their book they Reference, of course, Clifford Geertz— I feel like you must’ve heard of that guy. But I also Edward Bruener.

    This approach to therapy is all about language and text. So I was just curious if you had heard of these people.

    But it also goes to show how I approach counseling is a little bit differently than how I approach philosophy. I definitely approach how to counsel through the kind of philosophical/ discourse/text kind of postmodern kind of approach. But philosophically I approach it from what’s happening now, sort of as a critique upon that strictly textual.

    I guess actually there’s another example of how or the reason why “the two routes“ is significant in my work. Maybe. maybe

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